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The Doctrine of Proportionality in a Time
of War
E. Thomas Sullivan*
There has been an increasing number of armed conflicts,
and others looming on the horizon, that should cause us to
pause and think about why and how we go to war. The list is
long: Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iran, Syria, North Korea, etc.
One especially poignant method of analyzing our decisions to go
to war that has not received much attention is based on the Just
War doctrine.
The overarching principle behind the Just War doctrine is
proportionality: this doctrine observes that (1) any sovereign
undertaking a war should measure its response in proportion to
the claimed wrong, and (2) the means used to carry out that war
should be proportionate to the desired goal. The doctrine was
developed by early philosophers who were concerned with the
unprincipled, and often brutal, way that sovereigns of their time
went to war.'

* Provost and Senior Vice President, and Julius E. Davis Chair in Law, University of
Minnesota. This essay draws on material from a book on the subject of
proportionality to be published by Oxford University Press with Professor Richard
Frase. I wish to extend appreciation to Brian Atwood, Oren Gross, and David
Weissbrodt for their thoughtful review of a draft, and to Nicholas Smith for his
careful and thorough research assistance.
1. See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, PROLEGOMENA TO THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 21
(Oskar Piest ed., Francis W. Kelsey trans., Liberal Arts Press, Inc. 1957)
[hereinafter PROLOGEMA] ("Throughout the Christian world I observed a lack of
restraint in relation to war, such as even barbarous races should be ashamed of; I
observed that men rush to arms for slight causes, or no cause at all, and that when
arms have once been taken up there is no longer any respect for law, divine or
human; it is as if, in accordance with a general decree, frenzy had openly been let
loose for the committing of all crimes.").
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I. JUS AD BELLUM - THE DECISION TO GO TO WAR
One of the earliest proponents of the Just War doctrine,
Cicero, argued that there was only one justification for going to
war: to live "peaceably without suffering injustice."2 A war
motivated by any other reason was not only irrational, but also
more characteristic of beasts than human beings. 3 Later
philosophers refined this theory.
St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas both defined the
"just cause" required to go to war in terms of wrongs committed
by the other side. As Aquinas explained summarily, "[T]hose
who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on
account of some fault."4 Although Aquinas argued that the
attacking sovereign could be motivated by an advancement of
good or the avoidance of evil,5 little in his works suggests that
wars are justifiably undertaken when no clear fault lies with the
country being attacked.
Hugo Grotius added to the work of Aquinas and Augustine
to create a fairly comprehensive method to analyze when one is
justified in going to war and what means are deemed
appropriate to the end desired. Grotius contended that the
purpose of waging war was to restore a violated right against
6
those "who could not be held in check by judicial process."
Implicit in his argument is the required exhaustion of all
peaceful means, especially judicial processes, to attain justice.
In other words, the aggressor must use all human
understanding and natural reason to come up with a peaceful
solution to the problem. Only when judicial processes and
2. CICERO,
ON
OBLIGATIONS
bk.
1,
§
11,
available
at
http://www.oup.co.uk/pdf/0-19-924018-3.pdf See also ST. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD
bk. 19, ch. 12, available at http://www.ccel.org/fathers/NPNF1-02; PIERINO BELLI, 2
A TREATISE ON MILITARY MATTERS AND WARFARE 59 (Herbert C. Nutting trans.,
Oxford, The Clarendon Press; London, H. Milford 1936) (writing that "in war there
is no other objective than peace, and there is no peace apart from justice").
3. CICERO, supra note 2, bk. 1, § 11.
4. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Second Part of the Second
Part, question 40, art. 1 (Benziger Bros. ed. 1947).
5. Id.
6. PROLOGEMA, supra note 1, at 18. Quite similarly, Sir Robert Phillimore,
Member of Her Majesty's Honorable Privy Council and Judge of the High Court of
Admiralty, described war as an "exercise of the international right of action, to
which, from the nature of the thing and the absence of any common superior
tribunal, nations are compelled to have recourse, in order to assert and vindicate
their rights." 3 SIR ROBERT PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW
77 (2d ed. 1873).
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reason fail is one justified in resorting to force.7
Grotius's list of prerequisites to a just war exceeds that of
other philosophers, signaling his commitment to avoiding war at
Those requirements include: a just cause, the
all costs.
necessity of waging war to attain the just cause, 8 a
determination of the probability of success, 9 the right intention
proper
by the defender, 10 a public declaration of war by the
12
authority,1 ' and a proportional response to aggression.
Grotius provided some examples of reasons for going to war
that would probably be labeled "just"under his theory. Those
to a
include: self-defense, 3 indemnity, 14 punishment, 5 response
7
committed or imminent injury,' 6 and protection of others.' If it
was unclear whether the war was justified, Grotius demanded
8
that the doubt be resolved in favor of "peaceful" measures.'
Notably, Grotius wrote specifically about situations in
which one country is feeling threatened by another country, but
there is not a specific aggression or material threat present to
easily justify war. Grotius concluded that wars conducted for
expediency's sake were not justified.19 It is impossible to obtain
complete security in life, he argued, and one country's growth or

7. See CICERO, supra note 2, bk. 1, ch. 2, § 1.
8. PROLOGEMA, supra note 1. bk. 2, ch. 22, § 4 ("For to authorize hostilities as
a defensive measure, they must arise from the necessity, which just apprehensions
create; apprehensions not only of the power, but of the intentions of a formidable
state, and such apprehensions as amount to a moral certainty.").
9. Id. bk. 2, ch. 24, § 4.
10. HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE INCLUDING THE LAW OF
NATURE AND OF NATIONS (1625) bk. 2, ch. 22, § 17 (A.C. Cambell trans., M. Walter
Dunne 1901).
11. Id. bk. 1, ch. 3 §§ 4-5.
12. See PHILLIMORE, supra note 6, at 77-78 (establishing the requirements of a
just war as follows: a war must be waged by proper authority, to restore a violated
right and order among the states, and the means "must be in strict conformity with
this end").
13. GROTIUS, supra note 10, bk. 2, ch. 1, § 2.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. bk. 2, ch. 1, § 16.
17. HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS (ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE)
(1625) bk. 1, ch. 2, § 8 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1925),
http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/grotius/gro-102.htm ("Now it is in the love of
innocent men that . . . just wars have their origin ....

The teachings of Christ in

regard to loving and helping men ought, therefore, to be carried into effect unless a
greater and more just love stand in the way.").
supra
18.
Id. bk. 2, ch.
1, §note
17. 10, bk. 2, ch. 23, §§ 6-10.
19. GROTIUS,
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military expansion, without more, does not justify another's
resort to aggression. 20
Sovereigns must rely on "divine"
precaution to achieve security, he
providence
and
defensive
21
argued.
A. BUSH'S POLICY OF PREEMPTIVE STRIKE
Against this backdrop, we should consider President Bush's
explicit acceptance of the possibility that preemptive wars may
be justified. In the document, The National Security Strategy of
the United States of America,22 President Bush explained how
his national policy would, in part, combat terrorist threats:
We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by . . . defending
the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and
abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our
borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the
support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act
alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting
to prevent them from doing harm
preemptively against such terrorists,
23
against our people and our country.

Although the idea of preemptive war is not new, it is worth
commenting on because at no other time has an American

president so explicitly accepted the idea of justified preemptive
strikes. In fact, President Dwight D. Eisenhower rejected
outright the idea of a preventative war.24 At the same time, it is
true that no previous president has ever foresworn the use of a
preemptive strike, even the first use of tactical nuclear weapons
25
in the European theater.

This is the case because, it is argued, forswearing the first

26
use of such weapons would weaken the "deterrence" rationale.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(Sept. 2002) [hereinafter NAT'L SECURITY STRATEGY].
23. Id. at 6.
24. GEOFFREY PERRET, EISENHOWER 449-50 (Random House 1999).
25. See Todd E. Pettys, Our Anticompetitive Patriotism, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1353, 1404 (2006) ("'The president always has the right and always has had the
No president through all of American
right [to launch a] pre-emptive strike ....
history has ever ceded, and nor would I, the right to pre-empt in any way necessary
to protect the United States of America.'") (alterations in original) (quoting Senator
John Kerry, Presidential Debate in Coral Gables, Florida, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 2175, 2188 (Sept. 30, 2004).
26. See American Society of International Law Proceedings, Strategic
Deterrenceand Nuclear War, 76 AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 23, 26 (Apr. 22-24,
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But clearly, not ruling out a preemptive strike is not the same
as asserting it as an explicit, muscular foreign policy. Moreover,
an overly aggressive explication of preemptive strike can have a
counterintuitive effect on deterrence. It can cause other nations
to take action to deter a preemptive strike-as in the case today
of Iran and North Korea. In short, the intended deterrent effect
can be undercut.
The new "preemptive" doctrine is said to be an adaptation of
centuries-old international law. 27 As Grotius had explained and

customary international law had adopted, one need not wait
28
until being attacked to justify going to war.

But in order to

strike, the threat had to be specific
justify such a preemptive
29
"imminent."
and
Citing September 11th as a small example of the
destruction that terrorists can accomplish, President Bush
argued that "[tihe greater the threat, the greater is the risk of
inaction-and the more compelling the case for taking
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty
30
remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack."
At first blush, the idea of a preemptive strike against an
uncertain attack seems at odds with the basic thrust of Just
Under traditional Just War theory, an
War principles.
imminent attack is usually one that a sovereign can readily
observe, like the mobilization of troops 31or artillery in such a way
as to almost certainly signal an attack.
The current administration stretches the idea of what is
imminent, seemingly for purposes of justifying a preemptive
strike. Under the guise of "adapt[ing] the concept of imminent32
threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries,"
the Bush Administration has justified preemptive attacks on
1982) (comments by Eugene V. Rostow, Director, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency).
27. NAT'L SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 22, at 15 ("For centuries,
international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can
lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent
danger of attack.").
28. GROTIUS, supra note 10, bk. 2, ch. 1, § 16.
29. See NAT'L SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 22, at 15; see also supra notes
19-21 and accompanying text.
30. NAT'L SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 22, at 15 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 15 ("Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the
legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat-most often a
visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.").
32. Id.
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"emerging threats" or gathering dangers. 33 This extension of the
concept of imminent threat implicates the standard of evidence
used to justify a preemptive strike.34 The missing weapon of
mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq, 35 or a one percent probability
of a threat, as described in Ron Suskind's recent book, The One
Percent Doctrine,36 arguably would not meet this standard.
It is here that the Bush Administration's idea of what
constitutes an "imminent threat" seems to stand most at odds
with Grotius. While their differences may be viewed as merely
semantic, it is important to remember the great cost of waging a
war.3 7

When making the decision to go to war because of

terrorist threats or otherwise, sovereigns would do well to
ensure that their response is "proportional" to the injury caused
or the magnitude of the imminent threat. As Grotius urged,
prudence dictates that doubts about the justification of a
38
particular war should be resolved in favor of peace.
II. JUS IN BELLO - MEANS OF WAGING WAR
Only after allthe prerequisites are met, and after all nonviolent attempts at resolving the conflict peacefully have failed,
may the aggressor appropriately call its decision to go to war
"just."39 This label of Just War is not a carte blanche to inflict

just any type or amount of damage that the aggressor may see
fit. The means by which a war is to be carried out are subject to
stringent proportionality requirements under the Just War
doctrine that dictate both which kinds and how much damage
may justifiably be inflicted on one's opponent.
Grotius posited that the war should be "carried on with not

33. Id. ([n
an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek
the world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle
while dangers gather.").
34. See GROT1US, supra note 10, bk. 2, ch. 1, § 17.
35. See Jim Rutenberg, Conceding Missteps, Bush Urges Patience on Iraq, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 26, 2006, Al.
36. RON SuSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE (Simon & Schuster 2006).
37. Colin L. Powell, U.S. Forces:Challenges Ahead, 71 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 32, 40
(1992) ("Wars kill people. That is what makes them different from all other forms of
human enterprise.").
38. GROTIUS, supra note 10, bk. 2, ch. 23, §§ 7-10. See also id. ch. 24, § 4
(contending that even if a just cause for going to war has been established, countries
should still refrain from using force if possible).
39. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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less scrupulousness than judicial processes are wont to be." 40

Thus, not only should the decision to go to war be measured and
limited by the same type of measured response inherent in
judicial processes, but the means with which that war is carried
on should also be checked by measured calculation and
prudence.
Grotius proposed a three-step analysis that warring
countries should use when determining which military actions
are proportionate and thus available to them. First, the country
should determine whether the action will create more harm
than good. 41 If the action will cause more harm than the good,
the means are not justified. If, however, the action will propel
the country toward its objective without creating too much
"evil," then the means may be justified. Second, if it cannot be
determined whether more good or more evil will come of the
action, the country may only utilize the means in question if it
42
tips the balance in favor of the good and away from the evil.

Finally, before the action is taken, the country must determine
whether the likelihood of the good occurring is great enough to
outweigh the magnitude of the potential harm. 43 Thus, if the
probability of success for that particular mission is small, and in
attempting it a large number of lives may be lost or a great deal
of property may be destroyed, that particular action should not
be taken.
Grotius summarized this three-step process into a fairly
simple and accessible analogy. Doctors use weak medicine for
44
weak diseases, and stronger medicine for serious diseases.
This is known today as the "classic dose response curve." 45 For a
mild headache, two pills will do. As the pain increases, so does
the dose. More severe problems may require more intrusive
solutions.
Importantly, Grotius limited the means deemed appropriate
for any military action to those necessary to successfully
completing the given objective. 46 If the goal could be completed
without inflicting injury to person or property, any means used
40. PROLEGOMENA, supra note 1, at 18.
41. GROTIUS, supra note 10, bk. 2, ch. 24, § 5.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See GOODMAN & GILMAN'S PHARMACOLOGICAL BAsIs OF THERAPEUTICS 34
(11th ed. 2006).
46. GROTIUS, supra note 10, bk. 3, ch. 1, § 2.
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that would result in damage would be viewed skeptically.
The requirement of "proportionality" both in the decision to
go to war and the means of carrying it out marks perhaps
Grotius's biggest contribution to protecting human life and
dignity. By limiting the scope of damage that may be inflicted
during a Just War, Grotius recognized the sanctity of human life
and introduced a strong dose of "humanitarianism" into a field
of thought not traditionally known for its respect for human life
or concern for collateral damage.
III. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ADOPTING
PROPORTIONALITY
The Just War doctrine continued to be developed by later
philosophers who modified and added to the framework that
Grotius had provided. It was not, however, until the latter half
of the 19th century that the international community formally
adopted, albeit in a limited context, the principle of
proportionality. The Geneva Convention of 1864 marked the
first major international attempt to use the principle of
proportionality to limit the suffering caused during the
prosecution of a war.47

The convention specifically addressed

the way that wounded soldiers were treated, 48 even providing
safe harbor to families who took care of the wounded in their
49
homes.
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 provided for more
applications of the principle of proportionality to the means of
war.50 Importantly, the conventions called for a tight fit
51
between the military actions taken and the military objective.
Up until this time, the principle of proportionality was used

47.

Geneva Convention of 1864, reprintedin

PHILLIMORE,

supra note 6, at 157-

60.
48.
49.
50.

Id. art. I, reprinted in PHILLIMORE, supra note 6, at 157.
Id. art. V, reprintedin PHILLIMORE, supra note 6, at 158.
Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18,
1907,
36
Stat.
2277,
1
Bevans
631,
available
at
http://www.icrc.ch/IHL.nsf/FULL/195?OpenDocument.
51. The Hague Convention specifically prohibited any seizure or destruction of
enemy property, "unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by
the necessities of war". Id. art. 23(g). Belligerent parties were called to avoid
destruction of religious buildings and buildings dedicated to art, science, and other

charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and
wounded reside, unless they are used for military purposes. Id. art. 27.
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only in international treaties to limit the means with which war
was carried out, failing to provide any proportionality limits on
the decision to actually enter into war. The limit came in the
52
UN Charter, which prohibits the threat of or use of force
except in cases of self- or collective defense.5 3 Thus, even when a
country is unjustifiably attacked, it should measure its response
to that attack proportionately to ensure it responds in an
appropriate manner. It is important to note that the doctrine
of
54
self-defense is embedded in Article 51 of the UN Charter.
The UN Charter, moreover, also expresses the principle
that military force only should be used upon authorization of the
UN Security Council,5 5 except in the case of the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense.5 6 These provisions allow
the argument that until the Security Council has taken the
necessary measures, a country may act in self-defense.
The U.S. attacks on Iranian oil platforms during Operation
Praying Mantis in the late 1980s provide an example of how the
principle of proportionality helps measure the appropriateness
of a military response.5 7 Two incidents prompted the United
States to mount a military attack on Iranian property and ships.
First, a Kuwaiti vessel flying under an American flag was hit by
a missile allegedly launched by Iran.58 Second, a U.S. vessel,
the U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts, was hit by a mine and nearly

52. U.
N.
Charter
art.
2,
para.
4,
available
at
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter.
53. Id. art. 51.
54. The classic definition found there derives from the Caroline case that
occurred in 1837. The Caroline incident occurred when a Canadian naval force
attacked a U.S. ship-the Caroline-that was carrying supplies from New York to
armed rebels plotting against the liberation of French Canada on the Canadian side
of Niagara Falls. See Nicholas J.S. Davies, The Crime of War: From Nuremberg to
Fallujah,
ONLINE
JOURNAL
(2004),
http://onlinejournal.com/artman/publish/article-82.shtml. Davies quotes the foreign
ministers' negotiated response and recognition of the principle of proportionality
that would govern the remainder of the conflict:
"Respect for the inviolable character of the territory of independent nations is the
most essential foundation of civilization," and ... this can only be legally overridden
by "a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation," and "the act. . . must be limited by that necessity,
and kept clearly within it."
Id. (second omission in original).
55. U.N. Charter art. 2 & ch. VII.
56. Id. art. 51.
57. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6).
58. Id. at 175.
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sunk.5 9 The United States responded to these acts by attacking
two Iranian oil platforms. A battle ensued in 60 which Iran
eventually lost two frigates and several speedboats.
The International Court of Justice was called on to
determine whether, under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter, the U.S. military response was appropriate. The Court
concluded that the oil platforms were not legitimate military
targets, 61 and that the attacks, viewed in context of the larger
operations of Operation Praying Mantis, were not a
proportionate measure of self-defense justified under the
62
Charter.
The principle of proportionality also plays an essential role
in controlling the means of warfare under current international
law. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of 1949 is
illustrative. 63 As a whole, Protocol I serves to protect those
engaged in a war from unnecessary and excessive injury or
harm. Implicit in the notions of necessity and excessiveness is a
proportionality constraint on the actions of a warring state.64 If
the military benefit to be obtained by an attack does not
outweigh the harm done to civilian life or property, the attack is
65
illegal.
Just as Grotius and his predecessors developed a number of
factors to consider when analyzing the proportionality of an
attack, Protocol I requires a country staging military operations
to consider a number of factors: the importance of the military
target,66 the presence of civilian population and infrastructures
in the target area 6 ' the potential civilian use of the military
target,68 the ability to provide prior notice to the authorities

59. Id. at 175-76.
60. Id. at 198.
61. Id. at 196-97.
62. Id. at 198.
63. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
availableat http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/protocoll.htm.
64. Protocol I prohibits the use of all means that cannot be directed at a specific
military target or cannot be used discriminately. Id. art. 51(4).
65. Id. art. 51(5)(b).

66.

Id.

67. Id. art. 51.
68. Id. art. 52 (creating a presumption in favor of protecting civilian targets
when it is suspected but not known that a civilian facility is being used for military
purposes).
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about the threat to civilian population, 69 the likely short-term
and long-term environmental damage, 70 the type of weapons
71 and the rights of neutral
available and their accuracy,
72
countries in the target area.
IV. MODERN EXAMPLE OF JUST WAR DOCTRINE REVIEW
- THE GULF WAR

Ultimately, as Professor Judith Gardam has observed, the
principle of proportionality seeks to find a meaningful balance
between two important but competing interests: "the swift
achievement of the military goal with the minimum losses of
one's own combatants
and the protection of the other party's
73
civilian population."
By way of illustration, we can look at the conduct of the
United States during the first Gulf War. The United States
wanted desperately to avoid engaging the Iraqi troops on the
ground as much as possible. To accomplish that goal, the U.S.
utilized its powerful and technologically superior air forces to
destroy and demobilize the Iraqi troops.
The plan was
successful.
Following weeks of heavy aerial bombardment, the Iraqi
Republican Guard provided little resistance to the ground
assault, and active hostilities ended just forty days after the
first air strike began. Although the U.S.-led liberation of
Kuwait has been praised for its swiftness, very little attention
has been paid to the damage done to the Iraqi infrastructure
and long-term devastating effects on the Iraqi population.
Notably, the extensive use of air strikes, arguably, caused a
number of civilian casualties, despite advanced technology that
allowed for more precise targeting of military targets.
V. THE POWELL DOCTRINE: MASSIVE FORCE
During the buildup to the Gulf War, General Colin Powell
announced his opinion about the way a war should be waged.
69. Id. art. 57.
70. Id. art. 55.
71. Id. art. 51(4).
72. See id. art. 64.
73. Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionalityand Force in International Law, 87
AM. J. INT'L L. 391,409 (1993).
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His view built on ideas espoused by former Secretary of Defense4
Casper Weinberger and centuries of prior military experience.
The Powell Doctrine, as it now called, requires a candid
evaluation of the circumstances leading up to a war. Powell
provided some questions that should guide decision makers
before entering into a war:
Is the political objective important, clearly defined and
understood?
Have all nonviolent policy means failed? Will military force
achieve the objective? At what cost?
Have the gains and risks been analyzed?
How might the situation to be altered, once it is altered by
75
force, develop further and what might be the consequences?
76
Is there a plausible "exit" strategy in place?
Once the United States decides to enter a war, the Powell
77
Doctrine calls for massive or overwhelming force to be used.
This is to ensure that U.S. casualties are minimized and the
military objective is accomplished without delay.78 Although the
goals of using such force are certainly admirable, even the terms
"overwhelming"
and
"massive"
seem
to
imply
a
"disproportionality" that stands at odds with the Just War
doctrine and international conventions.7 9 Perhaps that is why
80
General Powell prefers the term "decisive" force.
74. Colin Powell served as a military advisor to Secretary Weinberger, who
articulated the 6-part Weinberger Doctrine in 1984 that would be used to determine
when and how to commit U.S. troops:
(1) vital national interests must be at stake; (2) overwhelming force must be
employed to ensure victory; (3) political and military objectives must be clearly
defined; (4) force structures and dispositions must be adjusted as events on the
ground dictate; (5) there must be "some reasonable assurance" of public and
congressional support; (6) force must be the last resort.
ROBERT C. DIPRIzIO, ARMED HUMANITARIANS 3 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2002)
(citing Casper W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," address to the Nat'l
Press Club, Washington, D.C. (28 Nov. 1984).
75. Powell, supra note 37, at 38.
76. DIPRIZIO, supra note 74, at 3 ("In time, those sympathetic to what became
known as the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine (W-P Doctrine) would interpret 'clear
objectives' to mean an 'exit strategy,' which in practice meant a timetable for victory
and withdrawal.").
77. Powell, supra note 37, at 40.
78. Id.
79. See supra sections II and III.
80. Interview on Meet the Press with Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, in
Washington,
D.C.
(Sept.
23,
2001),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2O1/5012.htm
("I
never
talked about overwhelming force, I've always talked about decisive force.").
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Although international conventions have moved toward a
more systematic analysis of what types of force are justified,
Powell has argued that adopting a set of rules to govern how to
wage a war is impractical and imprudent.8 ' First, establishing
clear guidelines lets your enemies know precisely what you will
do and how far you are willing to go.8 2

Powell argues that

apparent ambiguity is an essential part of successful warmaking.
Second, adopting guidelines may not allow the United
States to use the type of force most prudent in any given
situation. s3 He compared adopting a rigid set of rules for war to
adopting a company policy mandating elevator use when a fire
starts in the company's building. Although the policy is clear
and easily administered, it runs into obvious problems when the
fire actually begins in the elevator.8 4 He argued for a more
pragmatic approach to determining the type of force that is
appropriate under the situation.
CONCLUSION
The principle of proportionality may serve as an important
restraint on any sovereign's use of force. The principle mandates
that a country's decision to use force be in proportion to the
committed or imminent wrong. Once the decision to go to war is
made, proportionality also requires that the means and methods
of warfare be proportionate to the desired military goal.
International treaties' express and implicit adoption of
proportionality as a governing principle has contributed to
greater protection for civilians, non-military property, and
military personnel alike. Finally, I note the use of "massive
force" and President Bush's willingness to use preemptive
strikes to highlight that the principle of proportionality may
serve as an effective critique on the way this country enters into
and wages war. The Just War doctrine should serve as an
important reminder that our actions-in responding to threats
or attacks-should be guided by defensive precaution, respect
for human life, and a heavy dose of proportionality.
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